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Abstract: This research explores the relationship between journalistic freedom and media 
concentration in Kenya through the lens of the propaganda model (Baker, 2007). The research is 
based on two features of the 2013 General Election in Kenya: (1) a survey of the publics‘ confidence 
in the conduct of journalists during the 2013 General election in Kenya and (2) a survey of 
journalists` perceptions of influence of media ownership on journalistic independence in Kenya. This 
research concludes that an increase in media concentration in Kenya has led to the shrinking of the 
democratic space. 71 percent of the surveyed Journalists believe media diversity in Kenya is at risk 
whilst 69 percent believe that viewpoint discrimination is occasioned by unhealthy Media Ownership 
trends in Kenya. The research also indicates that the perceived climate of distrust dogging the 
mainstream media in Kenya has seen the public turn to citizen journalism as an alternative source of 
information. This survey raises further questions about future implications for journalistic 
independence given the dominance of media concentration in Kenya. 
Keywords: journalistic freedom; democratic health; diversity 
 
1. Introduction 
The media has often been perceived as a political campaign tool to mop up support 
for and against influential political elites. The journalist and press critic A. J. 
Liebling (as cited in Baker 2007) opines that freedom of the press belongs to those 
who own one. This rather cynical remark makes ownership an issue of central 
focus in media studies today. It could also explain why politicians have often 
demonstrated a penchant for acquisition of media outlets to propagate their 
political ideologies to the electorate.  
Dean Alger (1998) opines that the news media are absolutely central to the 
functioning of democracy today; and entertainment and other features and 
programs in the mass media, in the aggregate, have powerful effects on society 
more generally. Further he contends that how news organizations in particular are 
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operated and, ultimately, who owns and controls the main media we all rely on for 
information, exchange of ideas and basic images are fundamental in determining 
whether the democratic process works as intended, or whether it falters or is 
subverted. 
Globally, media ownership has become increasingly concentrated, dominated by a 
few key players. Perhaps most powerful amongst them is Rupert Murdoch, the 
founder and CEO of News Corporation. Recently, Murdoch became the subject of 
backlash from those who believe his presence is becoming too powerful given his 
inclination to double in European politics and beyond
1. Murdoch‘s move is further 
evidence that the mainstream news that influences the way we think, act and 
behave comes from an increasingly concentrated source.  
Another well-known media mogul is Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
(Doyle, 2002), who has a vast media empire controlling three of Italy‘s largest 
private television stations, and a further three public stations whilst in office. 
Berlusconi‘s vast media empire has unceasingly become a target of public 
opprobrium for its potential to sway political gimmickry in Italy in ways that 
weaken the public sphere and existence of a plural democracy.  
In Kenya, it was observed that as early as 2009 there was a dangerous media 
ownership trend emerging: Media Ownership Concentration. (Mbeke, et.al 2009). 
Politicians increasingly patronized the media perhaps with an eye for the 2013 
general election. (Mbeke, et.al. 2010) As the stakes in Kenyan politics rose, 
politicians increasingly took advantage of media liberalisation to directly or 
indirectly acquire media interests with which to secure their place in politics
2
. 
During this period, content from sections of the media outlets were noted to be 
biased. (Simiyu, 2013) 
Given the prevailing political environment and the emerging media ownership 
concentration, the overriding question is whether it was plausible to have the media 
play the most significant watchdog function in the coverage of the 2013 General 
Election in Kenya?  
Mara Einstein (2004) opines that the more concentrated the media industry, the 
more the constriction of diverse public opinion across the communications 
landscape. Indeed, critics of the media, denounce the hegemony of the media and 
the ever-increasing power of the consolidated media conglomerates.  
Baker (2007) contends that concentrated media ownership creates the possibility of 
an individual decision maker exercising enormous, unequal and hence 
undemocratic, largely unchecked, potentially irresponsible power.  
                                                          
1 Reuters. Twist in Murdoch saga strains Britain's coalition. Retrieved from: 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-britain-politicsbre85c0f7-20120613,0,1016378.story. 
2 (2012). Internews in Kenya | Factually true, legally untrue: Political Media Ownership in Kenya. 
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Gillian Doyle (2002) avers that ―political pluralism‖ is about the need, in the 
interests of democracy, for a range of political opinions and viewpoints to be 
represented in the media. Democracy would be threatened if any single voice, with 
the power to propagate a single political viewpoint, were to become too dominant.  
 
1.1. Problem Statement  
The overall research problem addressed in this study is that despite Kenya making 
significant strides in realizing freedom of expression in the media industry, media 
concentration and overbearing political regimes have often conspired to undermine 
journalistic independence.  
Theodore Glasser and Marc Gunther (2005) as cited in Geneva Overholser and 
Kathleen (2005, p. 388) define journalistic independence as simply conditions in 
which a journalist can live and operate without entanglements that the journalist 
may feel as real or potential conflicts of interest.  
From the foregoing, journalists must be willing, if fairness and accuracy require, to 
voice differences with their colleagues, whether in the newsroom or the executive 
suite. This stimulates the intellectual diversity necessary to understand and 
accurately cover an increasingly diverse society. This intellectual diversity can 
only be nurtured in a diverse media landscape.  
Though Kenya seems to have adequate media diversity, the hidden danger is that 
the ―diversity‖ that the public receives may not be genuine. Only when diverse 
viewpoints also come from diverse media sources and communicative power is 
maximally dispersed is the public interest represented in the media in the truly 
democratic sense. 
It is against this backdrop that this study focuses on the emerging media ownership 
trend in Kenya and journalistic independence and how interplay of these two 
factors could have affected the coverage of the 2013 general election.  
 
1.2 Objective 
The specific objective of the study is to examine media ownership in Kenya and its 
influence on news coverage and presentation. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
This study hypothesizes that the privately held media outlets are more likely to 
constrict viewpoint diversity than a publicly held entity.   
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2. Conceptual Framework 
This research is anchored on the Propaganda Model as propounded by Chomsky 
and Herman 2002). The model focuses on the inequality of wealth and power and 
its multi-level effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the path by 
which finances and prevailing power matrix are able to constrain viewpoint 
diversity and only churn out news content that best serves the interests of the 
owners of the privately held media outlets.  
Chomsky and Herman (2002) assert that news content is the reproduction of the 
hegemonic interests of the elite. The majority of media coverage either ignores or 
diminishes news that might negatively affect the bottom line of the corporate 
owners of the news outlet (Houston, 2004).  
Chomsky (2004) further contends that rather than function as the fourth estate, the 
mass media have taken on the role of mass propagandist, serving as little more than 
a mouthpiece for the government and the corporate elite  
Parenti (1997)
1
 argues that the mistakes of the media cannot all be innocent in 
nature. He outlines six key tools the corporate mass media use to stay on message, 
specifically the message that suits their corporate masters. These include:  
1. Suppression by omission: ―Manipulation often lurks in the things left 
unmentioned.‖ (Parenti, 1997, p. 1)  
2. Attack and destroy the target: ―The media move from ignoring the story to 
vigorously attacking it.‖ (Parenti, 1997, p. 2)  
3. Labeling: ―Media people seek to predetermine our perception of a subject with a 
positive or negative label.‖ (Parenti, 1997, p. 2)  
4. Face-value transmission: ―One way to lie is to accept at face value what are 
known to be official lies, uncritically passing them on to the public without 
adequate confirmations.‖(Parenti, 1997, p. 3)  
5. False balancing: ―Both sides are seldom accorded equal prominence.‖ (Parenti, 
1997, p. 3)  
6. Framing: ―By bending the truth rather than breaking it…communicators can 
create a desired impression without resorting to explicit advocacy.‖ (Parenti, 1997, 
p. 3) 
Parenti (1997) avers that these six tools ultimately help avoid displeasing those in 
political and economic power (Parenti, 1997). McChesney and Nichols (2002) 
opine that it is this shift in emphasis that ultimately poses a direct threat to the 
expansion of the democratic space in societies.  
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McChesney (1999) argues that any inquiry into how media ownership in monopoly 
capitalism inhibits the capacity of citizens to attain a democratic genuinely 
egalitarian participatory democracy must include studies of how a system-wide 
propaganda that favors the system itself is maintained. McChesney (ibid) argues 
that Herman and Chomsky‘s (1988) propaganda model is essential insofar as it 
provides a framework of filters for understanding how news systems operate to 
produce opinions that favor the political economic status quo. Looked at from this 
perspective, it will be foolhardy for one to argue that bias in media content is more 
of an individual journalist`s liberal bias than a corporation`s conservative bias. 
Suffice to say that such a view completely ignores those that journalists work for.  
Granted, reporters could be as liberal as they wished however; this would not 
change what news they could be allowed to report or how they could report it.  
Many journalists in Kenya allege that their inaction to point out electoral 
malpractices was informed by the fear of their conduct in the 2007 post poll chaos 
which they (journalists) were largely indicted for fuelling tensions in the electorate. 
Ahead of the 2013 general election, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) jointly 
with the Media Owners Association (MOA) and editors developed and signed a 
code of conduct
1
 to guard against their journalists fanning violence, as happened in 
2007. Media outlets were asked to avoid reporting in a manner liable to incite the 
public. By extension, media outlets were also asked not to conduct their own vote 
tallies as they did in 2007, but instead to rely on the IEBC official tallies.  
However, some of the guidelines relating to hate speech and incitement in the said 
document are ambiguous. Such ambiguity could provide a fertile ground for an 
overbearing political regime to constrict journalistic freedom. In fact, such hastily 
developed electoral guidelines actually inhibit the presentation of controversial 
issues of public importance to the detriment of the public and in degradation of the 
editorial prerogative of broadcast journalists. It is plausible that constrained by 
such policies, journalists could condone acts of politically inclined individuals who 
profess to do something for an honourable, publicly declared motive while really 
doing it from a disreputable hidden one. 
Henry Maina of Article 19 (Kenyan Chapter) opines that it is incumbent upon 
journalists of repute to point out yawning gaps between a society`s democratic 
ideals and its practice. He sees media`s inability to probe/take to task Kenya`s 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) over the polling 
procedure and allegations of vote-rigging as irresponsible journalism.
2
 Such 
journalism is characterized by partisanship and/or brown envelope syndrome.  
                                                          
1 Media Council of Kenya: Guidelines for Election Coverage in Kenya, April, 2012, Retrieved on 
12/4/2013 at 1.38am from http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/Media-Laws/View-category.html. 
2http://allafrica.com/stories/201303290100.html?viewall=1. 
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According to Shitemi Khamadi of Internews
1
, an international media development 
organization, it would seem that the biggest concern in Kenya today is the 
willingness of individual journalists to kowtow to corporate and government 
interests given the fact that media organizations are owned and controlled by some 
of the largest and richest corporations which are in turn owned and controlled by 
individuals who double in politics. It would thus be difficult for such media moguls 
to employ or keep in their employment journalists who consistently cover news in 
a political tone that they do not like. This could perhaps explain why journalists in 
the employment of such media outlets allegedly left so many things unsaid and said 
many things inaccurately.  
According to McQuail (1987) organizational imperatives tend to override personal 
preferences, except at the highest level, and media organizational ―policy‖ is more 
collective than an individual phenomenon. Such ―policies‖ are more often than not 
determined by an organization`s political allegiance. These ensure that only those 
journalists with similar political orientations are hired in their organizations. 
Besides, given the fact that most journalists are in the middle class, they are likely 
to be subservient to their benefactors read employers.  
Gans (1979) opines the middle-class position of the journalistic profession is a 
guarantee to their subservience to the capitalistic system. In this regard, journalists 
see and interpret the world through similar lenses much the same way with those of 
the real holders of power. Herein, the real holders of power are media moguls who 
also double as powerful politicians and who have created monolithic media 
empires with a view to propagating their political ideologies to the public. 
Chomsky (2002) concurs with this view when he opines that because much of the 
mainstream media is owned by corporate conglomerates, the media‘s coverage of 
political issues often reflects these corporate interests. They do this by deliberately 
outlawing opinions that media owners do not like. 
McQuail (2005) avers that diversity of media content stands in opposition to 
monopoly, uniformity, conformity and consensus. But is the liberalization of the 
airwaves a panacea to such maladies? This is not necessarily the case. Political 
elites may buy existing media and/or establish new ones to ensure that what is 
referred to as ―media landscape‖ is skewed in their favour.  
McQuail (2005) doubts the efficacy of privately held media outlets in serving the 
public interest. McQuail (2005) argues that such media are likely to be in the 
monopolistic ownership of a capital class, nationally or internationally organized 
and serve the interests of that class. In this respect, the media works ideologically 
by disseminating the ideas and world views of the ruling class, denying alternative 
ideas which might lead to change or to growing consciousness of the proletariat.  
                                                          
1 Ibidem. 
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Althusser (1971) as cited in McQuail (1987) points out that the ideology so 
disseminated is a pervasive and deliberate cultural influence which serves to 
interpret experience in a covert but consistent manner.  
Critics of consolidation aver that concentration and conglomeration of the media 
lead to undue political influence. Baker (2007) argues that the recent concentration 
of media ownership and thus of economic power in ever fewer corporations is 
inimical to—and if not checked will eventually destroy—the proper role of a free 
press in a democracy. He asserts that a single media entity could potentially 
provide an elaborately diverse system of viewpoints, but these viewpoints would 
run the risk of sharing crucially similar elements, since they are indeed products of 
the same source. So, although diverse viewpoints might satisfy the public, the 
hidden danger is that the ―diversity‖ they receive is not genuine. Only when diverse 
viewpoints also come from diverse media sources and communicative power is 
maximally dispersed is the public interest represented in the media in the truly 
democratic sense.  
Baker
 
(2007) captures this affront to democracy when he opines that media 
concentration is a major impediment to the provision of quality media product as 
well as to the accomplishment of the democratic standard concerning classless 
dispersal of communicative power. In media concentration, as media firms unite 
and profit becomes the main priority, the quality of the product and the numbers of 
viewpoints represented are perilously constricted.  
Baker (2007) focuses tightly on the fact that media concentration will bring 
unequal democratic power to the large corporations that own many of the media 
outlets. His view is rooted in a normative theory of democracy that values 
democracy as an end, not merely as a means, because democracy embodies the 
values of equality and autonomy. Increased concentration leads inevitably to a 
public loss of democratic power.  
Bagdikian (2004) opines that such concentrated ownership ultimately gives media 
moguls more power than exercised by any despot or dictator in history. He notes 
that the steady increase in media power enjoyed by media conglomerates has 
translated into a steady accumulation of power in politics.  
Croteau and Hoynes (2001, p. 37) suggest that the structural constraints created by 
the primacy of business concerns have prevented the media from ―promoting active 
citizenship, education, and social integration‖ through their messages. Instead of 
media that is diverse, innovative substantive, and independent, we have media 
whose content is homogenized, imitative, trivial and constrained. Such ownership 
abrogates the right of journalists to operate professionally. As Gans (2003) argues, 
journalists find themselves in a situation of ―disempowerment,‖ precisely due to 
the corporate and commercial imperatives of the industry. The humanity of 
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journalists is evident in some content, as much when they break with the official 
line as when they consciously convey propaganda.  
Gans (2003) contends that inasmuch as we see flushes of journalistic autonomy 
existing, and some journalists even daring to challenge the edicts of the filters, the 
stark reality is that the predominant corporate organizational structure forces 
journalists to work under very severe restrictions that do not allow the media to be 
structurally free or operate outside the interests of the elite. Media owners have 
latitude to appoint and promote staff to ensure that the media they own reflects and 
promotes their views. Indeed, one of the key concerns at present concerning the 
media, as it interacts with ownership, is that it does not serve the principles of 
democracy because a small number of owners may constrain viewpoint diversity 
through deliberate exposure of consumers to a limited information choice.  
This is in part informed by the fact that mass media production is primarily a 
business, and that the metrics for a successful business are different than those for a 
successful democracy. In short, the interests of the media producers may not 
intersect with the interests (or at least the ideals) of the consumers. As an example 
of this viewpoint, James Squires (apud Miller 1998, p. 21), former editor of the 
Chicago Tribune, has referred to the modern press as ―no longer an institution 
dedicated to the public interest, but rather a business run solely in the interest of the 
highest possible level of profitability.‖  
In order to protect their incomes, journalists often adopt different attitudes that will 
have different effects on them as determined by the political economy of the media. 
Consequently, journalists generally tend to be socialized with certain values that 
will enable them to work and move up in their profession, or that they will tend not 
to show their own values if they are different. Moreover, according to Herman, 
―what journalists do, what they see as newsworthy, and what they take for granted 
as premises of their work are frequently well explained by the incentives, 
pressures, and constraints incorporated into such a structural analysis.‖ (Chomsky 
& Herman, 2002, p. xi) 
Kuypers (2002) affirms that the media demonstrates an effortless readiness to press 
forward with its own principles concerning appropriate public policy (p. 202). 
Kuypers (2002) believes that the whole purpose of mass media is to employ frames 
through the use of ―certain keywords, metaphors, concepts, and symbols‖ (p. 199) 
which work together to create the relevancy of one issue over another.  
Kuypers (2002) found out that press coverage ran under the mask of an explicit 
agenda whereby the media manipulates its own people on contentious issues.  
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2.1. Media Ownership, Concentration and Political Patronage in Kenya 
Kenya has a robust media landscape. Lately, there has been a tendency towards 
media concentration. In particular, cross media ownership has been noted. Media 
Max, a group associated with Uhuru Kenyatta, has taken over The People Daily of 
veteran politician Kenneth Matiba, K24 TV and the Kikuyu language Radio station 
Kameme FM, both formerly owned by media entrepreneur Rose Kimotho. (Mbeke, 
O. P; et.al. 2010) TV Africa Holdings is also owned by the Kenyatta family. In 
2007, TV Africa holdings bought STV from renowned journalist Hilary Ng‘weno 
and now it uses the channel to transmit Al Jazeera. The latest addition to Media 
Max is Milele FM. 
Kalee Ltd, associated to Deputy President William Ruto has, Kass FM; Kass 
Weekly; Kass TV. Kass FM, a station named as guilty of inciting violence in the 
2007 post poll chaos, Kass FM, has allegedly sold a 49 percent stake to William 
Ruto. (Nyanjom, 2012) The latter is also associated with Chamge FM, a radio 
station that broadcasts to a largely Kalenjin audience in the expansive Rift Valley 
region of Kenya
1
.  
Charity Ngilu, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the allies of Uhuru Kenyatta 
has also acquired Mbaitu FM/SioKimau, a Kamba FM station broadcasting in 
upper Eastern Kenya.  
Three other allies of Uhuru Kenyatta have invested in the media industry in Kenya. 
These include Najib Balala who bought Sheki FM and Pilipili FM that broadcasts 
in the coastal town of Mombasa. Ali Mwakwere owns Kaya FM, which he 
aggressively used at one time to re-gain his seat in a by-election in 2011.  
Kenya Prime Minister Raila Odinga also owns an uptown FM station, Radio 
Umoja, which targets the youth. A political ally of Raila Odinga, Jakoyo Midiwo, 
on his part owns Lake Victoria FM
2
.  
Other media outlets include KBC the state broadcaster that owns over 20 radio 
stations while Nation Media Group (NMG) owns seven newspapers, several 
magazines. NMG also owns Nation Television (NTV). According to Othieno 
Nyanjom (2012)
3
, previously, NMG was perceived to be against the Moi regime, 
and in time, for Kibaki. Othieno further states that it is unsurprising that NMG 
supported Kibaki`s re-election bid and his Party of National Unity (PNU) in 2007, 
in fact, an NMG director was at the heart of the PNU campaign effort.  
                                                          
1Retrieved on 12/4/2013 at 2.40am from 
http://www.journalism.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&Itemid=51&catid=166&id=3741&vie
w=article. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Op.cit 
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The Standard Group (SG) whose largest shareholder is Baraza Limited
1
 (owned by 
the family of former President Daniel Moi, who in 2002 endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta 
to vie for the country`s presidency). Othieno (2012) further points at anecdotal 
information which suggests that Moi controls an estimated 85% of the company 
(much of it through proxy), thereby making other shareholders functionally 
inconsequential. See table 1 below on the list of known and likely Kenyan Political 
Links with the media.  
Table 1. Known and likely Kenyan political links with the media 
Registered Frequency Holder/Station ID Likely Political Link 
MediaMax – The People, K24, Kameme 
FM, Meru FM 
Connected to President Uhuru Kenyatta. 
 
Regional Reach Ltd – Kameme FM Rose Kimotho, sold to Media Max, 
company 
associated with President Uhuru Kenyatta 
STV Holdings – STV Sold to TV Africa 
Holdings,  
Associated with President Uhuru Kenyatta 
Digitopia – Milele FM, Anguo FM Granton Samboja, a prospective Taita 
Taveta politician (Milele FM sold to 
MediaMax, a company owned by Uhuru 
Kenyatta. 
Pili Pili FM Associated to Najib Balala, a political ally 
of President Uhuru Kenyatta.  
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation Ltd– 
Mbaitu FM; Syokimau FM 
John Musyimi; Mbaitu FM linked to 
Charity 
Ngilu, presidential aspirant (Mbaitu FM and 
Syokimau FM, sold to MediaMax; owned 
by President Uhuru Kenyatta.  
 
Mau West Development Initiative- Mururi 
FM 
John Muthutho, a political ally of President 
Uhuru Kenyatta.  
Radio Salaam  Associated to Yusuf Haji, a senator and 
political ally of President Uhuru Kenyatta.  
Radio Africa Ltd – Kiss FM; Kiss TV, 
Radio Jambo, XFM, Classic 105 
Kiprono Kittony, son of former Maendeleo 
ya Wanawake chair Zipporah Kittony, 
distant 
relative of former President Moi. 
Kalee Ltd – Kass FM; Kass Weekly; Kass 
TV 
CK Joshua, probable associate of Deputy 
President William Ruto 
Elgonet Communications 
Technologies Ltd - 
Joan Chelimo Poghisio, wife of Information 
and Communications minister Samuel 
Poghisio who is a political associate of 
Deputy President William Ruto. 
                                                          
1 Op.cit 
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Golden Dreams – Content production Alfred Mutua, gubernatorial candidate, 
Machakos 
Media Seven Group Magazines  
 
Hannington Gaya, a political ally of 
Raphael Tuju. 
Neural Digital Broadcaster Ltd –Radio 
Umoja; Radio Nam Lolwe 
 
Peter Oluoch, connected to parliamentarian 
Jakoyo Midiwo, first cousin to Prime 
Minister 
Raila Odinga 
Bondo Community Multimedia Centre – 
Radio Maendeleo 
Anthony Munyao, associated to Raphael 
Tuju, presidential aspirant 
Fish Media – Fish FM Reuben Kigame, gubernatorial candidate, 
Vihiga County 
Sauti ya Mwananchi Radio and TV Ltd Joseph Koigi Wamwere, ex – 
parliamentarian. 
Sauti ya Pwani  
 
John M. Musyimi, a political ally of 
President Uhuru Kenyatta.  
 
Sauti ya Rehema – Sayare FM; Sayare TV 
 
Rev. Eli Rop, Board of Directors previously 
included Prof Margaret Kamar, 
parliamentarian and wife of former 
parliamentarian Nicholas Biwott. 
Southern Hills Development Agency – 
Kaya FM 
 
Mandale Warrakah/Rose Mwakwere, 
brother and wife of minister Chirau 
Mwakwere, a political ally of resident 
Uhuru Kenyatta. 
Royal Media Services Ltd –Citizen TV; 
Citizen Radio and 11 vernacular radio 
stations 
 
Samuel K. Macharia, previous 
parliamentary 
candidate Gatanga, links to various senior 
politicians 
Source: Othieno Nyanjom (2012), Internews in Kenya, Factually true, legally untrue: 
Political Media, unpublished Research paper 
 
3. Research Methodology 
This is a survey research. Two separate surveys will be conducted with a view to 
ascertaining the:  
(1) publics’ confidence in the conduct of journalists during the 2013 General 
election in Kenya and (2) journalists` perceptions of influence of media ownership 
on journalistic independence in Kenya.  
There will be piloting of the structured interview to a small representative sample 
after which journalists will be interviewed between 10
th
 April 2013 and 20
th
 April 
2013.  
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In the first survey, a survey of voting-age people will be carried out in five counties 
in Kenya. An eleven-item closed-ended questionnaire will be developed and 
administered to one hundred respondents in towns from five Counties in Kenya. 
The Counties to be covered by the study are: Mombasa, Nairobi, Kisumu, Nyeri 
and Uasin Gishu. This provides for adequate national demographic configuration 
for the study.  
Within each of the five zones a total of 20 persons will be selected to respond to 
the question items in the questionnaire. The respondents will be selected based on a 
dimensional sampling approach to make sure that dimensions of sex, age and 
education, and SES would be represented. 
The study will be carried out with the help of five trained research assistants. 
However, the research frame will make reference to events six months before and 
two months after the general election. This is the period immediately before and 
after the elections when the memory of the media coverage was more likely to be 
fresh in people‘s minds. 
In the second survey, journalists working for the mainstream media outlets in 
Kenya will be interviewed to establish whether there was a plausible link between 
ownership of the media outlets and the manifest bias in the news content.  
Participants will be obtained through snowballing. A total of one hundred (100) 
journalists from both the print and broadcast media participants will respond to a 
series of questions rated using a Likart Scale model. All the respondents will be 
assured of complete anonymity to facilitate candid answers. 
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4. Findings  
4.1. Public Perception of Media  
The initial question that the respondents were asked was whether they were 
generally satisfied with the media coverage of the 2013 general election.  
To what extent were you satisfied with the amount of media coverage of the 2013 
general election?  
 
 
Figure 1 
The findings indicate that 21 percent of the respondents were generally satisfied 
with the media performance of the 2013 general elections whilst 74 percent of the 
respondents were generally dissatisfied with the performance of the media. 
In order to assess the reachability of the print and broadcast media the respondents 
were to respond to the following question: Between broadcast media (Radio/TV) 
and print media (newspapers/ magazines), which of these media gave you a more 
comprehensive account of the 2013 general elections? 
The findings indicate that 66% of the respondents agreed that broadcast media gave 
them a more comprehensive account of the 2013 general elections while 32% of 
the respondents paid tribute to print media. The remaining 2% of the respondents 
felt that none of the above media was satisfactory in the coverage of the election.  
It can therefore be concluded that more people in Kenya get their news from radio 
and television compared to newspapers. See figure 2 below. 
2 19 
5 
43 
31 
Level of Satisfaction with Media Performance 
Strongly satisfied
Satisfied
Indifferent
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied strongly
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Figure 2 
The research also sought to find the perception of the public confidence and trust of 
the performance of the publicly owned/state radio and TV stations. In this regard, 
the respondents were to rate the performance of public broadcasting (KBC Radio 
and TV) stations in the coverage of the 2013 elections in terms of public 
confidence and trust. See figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3 
The question above is crucial and the responses indicate a general climate of 
distrust of the public media. Only 12% of the respondents rate the public broadcast 
media very high. In a contrast between high and low, 23% of the respondents rated 
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the performance of public broadcast media in the election high whilst 63% of the 
respondents perceive the state media in terms of low performance in election 
coverage. 2% of the respondents were indifferent to this question item. 
When asked to assess the coverage of private Radio and TV stations in the 
coverage of the 2013 election in terms of public confidence and trust, the findings 
clearly showed that there was insignificant difference in the public`s lack of 
confidence between the private and the public media: 64% and 63% thus raising 
questions as to the existence of an unholy alliance between conglomerates and an 
overbearing political regime. See Figures 3 above and figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4 
With regard to the public`s evaluation of the performance of the print media in the 
election coverage over half of the respondents felt that the print media`s 
performance was below par. See figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 
This question is crucial in respect to the public`s confidence in the performance of 
Kenya`s print media. The survey shows that 51% of the respondents think that the 
print media was unbalanced.  
There is also a cloud of distrust by the public regarding the freedom of journalists. 
Majority of the respondents were of the view that the journalists did not enjoy 
reasonable press freedom during the coverage of the 2013 election. See Figure 6 
below. 
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The above findings indicate that only 21 percent of the respondents think that 
journalists were working under conditions of reasonable press freedom during the 
2013 general elections while 72 percent claimed there was no reasonable press 
freedom. 
Even though most respondents would not have a very comprehensible or detailed 
understanding of how journalists work, there was a widely shared perception that 
the conditions for freedom of expression in Kenya were largely unfavourable to 
journalists. 
Quite crucial too was whether the principal of equal coverage of political parties 
and candidates was adhered to by media establishments in the 2013 general 
election. The findings indicate that there was a general perception in the public that 
the media`s coverage was skewed to favour certain political parties and individuals. 
Only 6 percent of the respondents agreed that there was equal coverage of political 
parties and candidates during the 2013 general elections.  
However, - respondents (77 percent) said there was not equal coverage of political 
parties and candidates by media practitioners during the election. There was a 
general perception that the media were not providing a balanced, fair coverage of 
different political options other than that of Jubilee and CORD coalitions. See 
Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7 
When asked to rate the perception of bias in the media‘s handling of the election, 
63% of the respondents thought that there was presence of bias. See figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8. 
The research then sought to know the source of the bias in the coverage of the 
election. In this regard the following question was asked: Was there bias in the 
media content? If yes, what was responsible for the biases in news and other 
reports by the media during the 2013 general election?  
The findings indicate that most respondents (55 percent) identified ownership and 
control structure of media organizations as a major reason for biased reporting 
during the 2013 general elections whilst 22% of the respondents blamed the 
scenario on the brown envelop syndrome in the media circles. 23% of the 
respondents identified irresponsible journalism for bias in news and other reports 
during the 2013 general elections. On the issue of public confidence in the media 
performance in the 2013 general election in Kenya, the respondents were asked to 
state the degree to which they think that the media in Kenya probed the results of 
the elections as announced by IEBC. 
The findings show that out of the respondents, only 14 % said media probed the 
results of the elections as announced by the IEBC. 84% of the respondents claimed 
that the media did not probe the election results as announced by IEBC despite 
widespread charges of vote count anomalies. See figure 9 below. 
16 
47 
4 
24 
9 
Public`s Rating of Bias in the Performance of the 
Media 
Very high
High
Indifferent
Low
Very Low
COMMUNICATIO 
 
 63 
 
Figure 9 
This research also intended to assess the role of citizen journalism in the 
communicative landscape in the country. In this regard this research asked the 
following question: To what extent do you agree that the citizen journalism played 
a positive role in the coverage of the 2013 general election in Kenya? See Figure 
10 below. 
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The findings show that majority of the respondents agreed that citizen journalism 
played a positive role in the coverage of the 2013 general election in Kenya. 78% 
of the respondents agreed that the new media is instrumental in the coverage of the 
2013 election. 19% of the respondents disagreed whilst only 3% of the respondents 
were indifferent. 
 
4.2. Journalists Perception of Media Ownership on Journalistic 
Independence.  
A seven-item closed-ended questionnaire was developed and administered to one 
hundred (100) journalists on a snowballing basis. This was deemed the most 
appropriate method given that some media houses had forbidden journalists in their 
employment from granting any interviews on matters touching on the conduct of 
their organization in the coverage of the 2013 general election. The researcher and 
the research assistants had to thus purposively identify a few journalists who led 
them to other journalists willing to grant the researchers an interview in privacy.  
When asked of their perception of how important independence of media was in 
enhancing democratic life (Q1), an overwhelming majority (98%) of the surveyed 
journalists across the three newspapers felt that independence of media is important 
to democratic life.  
However, when asked to rate the journalistic independence given to express their 
own individual position when commentating on the 2013 general election in Kenya 
(Q.2), 66% of the respondents felt that they had no independence to express their 
views on the general election. Only 33% of the respondents disagreed whilst only 
1% of the respondents could neither agree nor disagree with this statement. See 
figures 11 below.  
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Figure 11 
When asked (Q.3) whether the owners of their respective media organizations did 
influence the editorial content during the coverage of the 2013 general election in 
Kenya, more than half of the respondents (51%) agreed that media owners 
influenced editorial content in the coverage of the 2013 general election whilst 
41% of the respondents felt that the media owners did not influence the editorial 
content. See figure 12 below 
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Further, this research sought to know whether there was a significant shift in the 
respective media outlets` editorial policy during the election period compared to 
other times (Q.4). 53% of the respondents felt that the editorial shift was high while 
45% thought that the editorial shift was absent.  
Two respondents could neither agree nor disagree.  
In exploring the question of media diversity in Kenya and its impact on journalistic 
work (Q.5), the following question was asked: To what extent do you agree that 
Kenya has adequate regulations to protect diversity in broadcast media?  
The findings indicate that majority of journalist believe that media diversity in 
Kenya is threatened. See figure 13 below. 
 
 
Figure 13 
Only 28% believe regulation to protect diversity in Kenya‘s broadcast media is 
adequate. Considering that 71% of those surveyed do not believe that Kenya has 
adequate media diversity and agree that legislation is needed to protect diversity is 
indicative of a worrying trend insofar as journalistic freedom is concerned.  
This survey also looked at private media ownership and what this means for 
journalistic independence (Q.6). Journalists were required to rate the extent of their 
agreement with the statement: Media Diversity is at risk in Kenya due to media 
ownership trends. Figure 14 below.  
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Figure 14 
Again, over 69 percent believe that diversity is at risk due to trends in ownership. 
There is no denying that this raises some very serious questions that the country 
must begin to address. 
In order to find out the perception of the respondents regarding the role of the new 
media in Kenya (Q.7), the research asked the respondents to state the extent to 
which they agreed with the statement that the citizen journalism protects media 
diversity in Kenya. See figure 15 below. 
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The research established that 67% of the respondents agree that new citizen 
journalism is helping to protect diversity. While 3% were indifferent. A further 
30.4% disagreed with the view that citizen journalism protects media diversity in 
Kenya.  
Finally in assessing the role played by the Media Council of Kenya (MCK), 
respondents were asked to rate the level of confidence that they had in the 
performance of MCK before and during the 2013 general election in Kenya (Q.9). 
See Figure 16 below. 
 
Figure 16 
The findings show that only 19 percent of respondents rate MK in terms of high 
performance. This research could not independently verify why so many 
respondents (22 percent) were indifferent to this question. However, considering 
that 59 percent of the respondents rate MCK in terms of low performance it is 
perhaps indicative of MCKs inability as a media regulator to act independently. 
This is disquieting insofar as regulation of quality of journalism in Kenya is 
concerned. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The thrust of this study was on the responsibility of the media in the monitoring 
election processes. The findings clearly showed that the was an insignificant 
difference in the public`s lack of confidence between the privately held media 
outlets and the public broadcaster (64% and 63% respectively) in covering the 
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electoral process. This finding negates the hypothesis that the privately held media 
outlets are more likely to constrict viewpoint diversity than a publicly held entity. 
This finding raises the question as to the existence of an unholy alliance between 
conglomerates and an overbearing political regime. 
Secondly, the research indicates that the majority of the respondents (in the two 
surveys) attribute the perceived bias and partisanship to media ownership 
concentration and an overbearing government. This observation reflects Chomsky 
and Herman‘s argument that news coverage tends not to question information from 
the powers that be (read as government), rather these media outlets serve as 
megaphones for governmental and corporate propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 
1988).  
Thirdly, dissatisfied by what appears to be an increasingly partisan media, the 
electorate has looked toward citizen journalism to fill the information gaps left by 
the mainstream journalists in Kenya. Suffice to say that citizen journalism has not 
only unsettled the practices of journalism but is positively changing them for the 
good.  
This study proposes several recommendations to protect viewpoint diversity and 
journalistic independence. The first recommendation is the need to provide clear 
guidelines for monitoring hate speech and incitement in Kenya`s broadcast and 
print media. The guidelines as currently constituted are ambiguous and thus 
provide a potential ground for an overbearing political regime to further constrict 
journalistic freedom.  
Secondly, the government must enact policies to guard against unhealthy media 
ownership trends that may eventually suffocate viewpoint diversity in news 
coverage.  
Thirdly, there ought to be safeguards for editorial independence. In this regard, 
declarations contracts must be signed by both editors and media owners to ensure 
that the latter do not interfere in editorial matters.  
Fourthly, there is a clear need for promotion of citizen journalism in order to 
expand the diversity of information choices for the public.  
Finally, there is need for a public audit into the conduct of MCK in the period 
leading to and during the 2013 general election. Currently, it would appear that 
MCK is either a captive of MOA or at best a facade for continued partisan 
interests. More importantly, there is need to review the Media Act to produce a 
more effective framework for MCK operations. MCK must get government 
funding without strings attached to make it independent of the colossal MOA. 
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